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The Labours of Zeno – a Supertask indeed? 
 
1. Introduction: 
The last 60 years have produced a prolific literature constituting the so-called super-
task debate – the debate whether an infinite sequence1 of actions or operations carried 
out in a finite interval of time is indeed possible.2 With the exception of J.F. Thomson 
and Max Black, people involved in this discussion usually claim that the original 
founder of the debate was Zeno with his dichotomy paradox.3 This paradox seems to 
pose the problem that the finite process of continuously running a finite distance re-
quires covering infinitely many spatial parts, and thus performing infinitely many 
tasks, a supertask.  
In this paper, I show that (a) Zeno’s paradox in fact does not present us with a 
supertaks but rather raises a very different worry. I will claim that Thomson and 
Black are right in denying Zeno to be the originator of the supertask debate, but for 
reasons different to the ones they provide us with. In a second step, I demonstrate that 
(b) comparing Zeno’s paradox with a paradigmatic supertask can nevertheless be in-
structive, since it forces us to make explicit some pre-conditions on which the very 
notion of a supertask rests and to examine whether these conditions are indeed given 
in the case of a continuous run.  
Understanding a continuous run as a series of tasks, and ultimately a super-
task, is prepared by the so-called at-at-theory of motion – the theory that claims that 
motion consists in nothing but being at a particular point at a particular time. But a 
closer look at Zeno’s paradox suggests that, in contrast to common scholarly opinion, 
we should not understand continuous motions as a series of tasks. For the require-
ments for supertasks and for continuous finite runs (whether or not presented by Ze-
no) are genuinely different and not reducible to each other; we will see that they have 
a different mereological structure. And indeed these differences suggest that we may 
want to re-think our usage of the at-at-theory for our account of motion. 
2. Supertasks 
The debate whether supertasks are possible is not a debate about Hercules and his 
                                                 
1 This account has been determined further as “a numerable infinite sequence” in recent times, in order 
to distinguish supertasks from hypertasks, which are non-numerable infinite sequences. 
2 Originally, the debate started in the journal Analysis, while many of the later articles in this debate 
were published in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 
3 He is either seen as simply inventing supertasks or as showing that supertasks are impossible. 
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labours. The question of the possibility of supertasks revolves not around tasks we 
might think divinities or superheroes to be engaged with. Rather, the core idea of a 
supertask is an infinite series of tasks to be performed either by human beings or by 
machines set up by human beings, or, more recently, by physical particles. The series 
of tasks is set up in such a way that the time between two tasks gets successively less-
er – and in recent versions, usually each task gets successively smaller – so that the 
time in between approaches zero. Thus, this infinity of tasks should be performed in a 
finite time, and no superpower should be needed. 
To illustrate such a supertask, let us look briefly at a very simple so-called “in-
finity machine”, i.e. a machine which is supposed to perform such a supertask: the 
reading lamp Thomson introduced as an infinity machine.4 This lamp has one switch 
to turn the light on and off. If we look at it over the period of one minute, we may 
imagine experiencing the following scenario: the button of the lamp is pressed to 
switch on the light after ½ a minute, it is pressed again to turn off the light after an-
other ¼ of a minute, pressed again to turn on the light after ⅛ of a minute, etc. Thus, 
after one minute, the task has been performed infinitely many times. 
 Are such supertasks logically possible but physically impossible? Or possible 
or impossible in both respects? The supertask debate has seen defenders of all three 
positions.5  
  The problem of the possibility of supertasks has often been situated within the 
discussion about the degree of determinism in a Newtonian framework:6 is a Newto-
nian framework thoroughly deterministic in such a way that every state of affairs can 
be deduced from the preceding ones, or do we also have to allow for some indeter-
minism?7 Thomson’s lamp was supposed to show that a statement about the last state 
of such a supertask is not possible: we will not be able to tell whether the lamp is on 
or off after one minute as the button has been pressed infinitely many times. Hence, if 
supertasks are possible, the chain of causes seems to be undetermined in certain areas. 
                                                 
4 Thomson, J. F., “Tasks and Supertasks”, in: Analysis 15, 1954, pp. 1-13. 
5 Cf., for instance, J. F. Thomson for impossibility in both respects, Peter Clark (in oral communica-
tion) for possibility in both respects, and Bertrand Russell as claiming logical possibility but physical 
(“medical” as he calls it) impossibility.   
6 More recently, however, supertasks have been introduced in the context of decision theory, see, for 
example, the articles of Andrew Bacon (2010), “A paradox for supertask decision makers”, in: Philo-
sophical Studies 153, pp. 307-311; and Barrett, J., & Arntzenius, F. (1999), “An infinite decision puz-
zle”, in: Theory and Decision 46(1), 101–103. 
7 Cf., e.g., Laraudogoitia (1996), Laraudogoitia (1997), p. 53, Earman & Norton (1998), p. 124, and 
Laraudogoitia (1999).  
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Accordingly, it seems that if we assume the kinds of infinity we are familiar with 
from the realm of mathematics, to have an isomorphic physical counterpart, it is hard 
to avoid such indeterminacies.  
Supertasks come in a variety of versions and have become increasingly refined 
and ingenious – Pi-machines, José Benardete’s “Paradox of the Gods” and Graham 
Priest’s and Stephen Yablo’s variations of it,8 or Pérez Laraudogoitia’s “Beautiful 
Supertasks”. The basic question has, however, stayed the same. The debate started in 
the 1950’s between Max Black, Richard Taylor, J. Watling, and J. F. Thomson,9 was 
rekindled by Laraudogoitia and others in the 1990’s, and has been in the literature 
since then. But the actual founder, it is claimed, is Zeno with his dichotomy para-
dox.10 So let us now look at his paradox. 
 
3. Zeno’s dichotomy paradox 
Aristotle, our main source for Zeno’s paradoxes of motion,11 discusses these paradox-
es in book VI, chapter 9 of his Physics (239b11-14). He does not spell out the dichot-
omy paradox there, however, but only points at it. Accordingly, this paradox has to be 
understood with the help of two other passages dealing with this paradox: 
τέτταρες δ' εi>σi\ν οι < λόγοι περi\ κινήσεως Ζήνωνος οi< παρέχοντες τa\ς 
δυσκολίας τοi~ς λύουσιν, πρw~τος μe\ν o< περì τοu~ μh\ κινεi~σθαι διa\ τo\ πρότερον 
εi>ς τo\ h[μισυ δεi~ν a>φικέσθαι τo\ φερόμενον h& πρo\ς τo\ τέλος, περi\ οu{ διείλομεν 
e>ν τοi~ς πρότερον λόγοις (239b9-14). 
                                                 
8 Cf. Priest, G. (1999), “On a version of one of Zeno’s paradoxes”, in: Analysis 59, pp. 1-2; and Yablo, 
S. (2000), “A reply to new Zeno”, Analysis 60(2), pp. 148–151.  
9 Taylor, Richard: (1951) Mr. Black on Temporal Paradoxes. In: Analysis 12, 1951; Watling, J.: (1952) 
The Sum of an Infinite Series. In: Analysis 13, 1952. 
10 In the supertask debate, the “dichotomy paradox” is meant to refer to what is sometimes also called 
the runner paradox, the paradox described below. For ancient philosophers, the name “dichotomy para-
dox” is also sometimes used for one of the plurality paradoxes. And the runner paradox is sometimes 
called “the stadium”, following Aristotle’s name for it in the Topics, 160b7 (a name which is, however, 
also used to refer to the fourth of Zeno’s paradoxes about masses moving in a stadium). I will stick to 
the name “dichotomy” in accordance with its usage in the supertask debate and in order to avoid confu-
sion, even if it might not be historically correct (cf. Gregory: Vlastos “Zeno's Race Course”, in: Studies 
in Presocratic Philosophy Vol. II. The Eleatics and Pluralists, ed. R. E. Allen und David J. Furley, 
London 1975, p. 215, n.2). I will concentrate here on some philosophical points of this paradox im-
portant for the debate in question; I give a much fuller discussion of the philological and philosophical 
problems this paradox raises in my book manuscript The Concept of Motion in Ancient Greek Thought, 
chapter 3. 
11 We find paraphrases of the paradox in Simplicius, Philoponus, Themistius and De Lin. Insec. (Lee, 
Zeno’s fragments (1967), fragments 20-22 and 24-25). But as they are very close to Aristotle’s report, I 
will not quote them here.  
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There are four arguments of Zeno about movement which cause problems for 
those who want to solve them: first, the one about the “not-moving,” on the 
grounds that before the moved thing gets to the end it must have arrived at half 
of it; this we have analysed in the preceding investigations [namely in 
233a21ff.]. 
διὸ καὶ ὁ Ζήνωνος λόγος ψεῦδος λαμβάνει τὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι τὰ ἄπειρα διελθεῖν 
ἢ ἅψασθαι τῶν ἀπείρων καθ’ ἕκαστον ἐν πεπερασμένῳ χρόνῳ (233a21-23). 
For Zeno’s argument turns out to be wrong (in assuming) that it is not possible 
to go through the infinite or to touch each single (part) of the infinite in a finite 
time.  
τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἀπαντητέον καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐρωτῶντας τὸν Ζήνωνος λόγον, 
καὶ ἀξιοῦντας, εἰ ἀεὶ τὸ ἥμισυ διιέναι δεῖ, ταῦτα δ’ ἄπειρα, τὰ δ’ ἄπειρα 
ἀδύνατον διεξελθεῖν, ἢ ὡς τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον τινὲς ἄλλως ἐρωτῶσιν, 
ἀξιοῦντες ἅμα τῷ κινεῖσθαι τὴν ἡμίσειαν πρότερον ἀριθμεῖν καθ’ ἕκαστον 
γιγνόμενον τὸ ἥμισυ, ὥστε διελθόντος τὴν ὅλην ἄπειρον συμβαίνει ἠριθμηκέναι 
ἀριθμόν· τοῦτο δ’ ὁμολογουμένως ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον (263a4-11). 
 
”In the same way one has to reply to those who put forth Zeno's puzzle and claim 
that, if it is always necessary to go through the half (before one can traverse the 
whole distance),12 and these (halves) are infinite (in number), then it is impossi-
ble to go through the infinite. Or, as the same argument is asked by some in a 
different way, at the same time as the movement starts across the half, one could 
count each single half which occurred before, so that we get the result that if 
something has travelled the whole (half), we have already counted an infinite 
number; but this is admittedly impossible. 
 
Taking all three passages together, we can reconstruct the problem raised by Zeno as 
follows: if something moves over a certain finite distance in a finite time, for exam-
ple, a runner covering a finite track, he first has to cover half of this distance. Of the 
second half of the given distance, the runner again has to cover the first half of the 
remaining distance, then again the first half of the still remaining distance, and so on 
ad infinitum. So he will have to pass an infinite number of spatial segments before 
reaching the end.13  
                                                 
12  Something like these words in brackets has to be understood as the background to make the argu-
ment understandable, and is added in all translations. Aristotle does not talk of distance here, only of 
“something infinite“. But when he refers back to this passage in 263a18, he asks how the question 
posed there would change if length (mh~koj) were not taken into account, which justifies the talk about 
distance or length in the passage quoted. 
13 In 263a4-11 this paradox is presented in two forms, which, in accordance with the usage of the sec-
ondary literature, can be called “progressive” and “regressive” (cf.,e.g., Salmon (1980), pp. 32-33, and 
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It has frequently been claimed that Zeno’s paradox thus shows a runner run-
ning a finite distance to be performing infinitely many tasks – a supertask.14 At least 
this is how well-known scholars of ancient philosophy, like Jonathan Barnes and 
Kirk, Raven, and Schofield, have understood it. Barnes for example, sums up the di-
chotomy paradox as follows:15 
Zeno thinks to establish: (1) If anything moves, it performs infinitely many tasks. Since he 
holds it to be a truism that: (2) Nothing can perform infinitely many tasks, he concludes that 
nothing moves. Unless we are to follow Zeno into his immobile world, we must reject either 
(1) or (2). Philosophical controversy has settled about (2).16  
Thus, Barnes understands the paradox exactly as positing the problem of performing 
infinitely many tasks in a finite time, and thus as understanding motion as a supertask. 
He is right that in the past the debate has indeed centred on the possibility of super-
tasks (2), rather than on the question whether the paradox is indeed presenting motion 
as a supertask (1). This second point is also the focus of Barnes’s discussion. Howev-
er, I want to demonstrate in the following that the debate concerning Zeno’s paradox 
should settle on (1), on whether the paradox does indeed aim to establish motion as a 
supertask. More precisely, I want to show, first, that Zeno’s paradox does indeed not 
pose the problem of understanding a run as performing infinitely many tasks, and that, 
second, we should not try to conceptualize a continuous run as a supertask either.  
This will be done by comparing the features of motion presented to us in Ze-
no’s paradox with the features of a supertask. In order to decide whether the dichoto-
my paradox can be understood as a supertask, we have to get clearer first on what the 
decisive features of a supertask are. So let us begin by analysing the notion of a super-
task, before we compare supertasks to the way motion is captured in Zeno’s paradox. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Vlastos (1975a), p. 201). The first variant, the progressive form, is just the given state of affairs. The 
second, regressive version, shows that the runner must have already gone through an infinite number of 
spatial segments to cover even the first half of the distance. So while in the first variation a runner can 
never reach the end of his track, in the second he cannot even get started. As the supertaks debate has 
focused on the progressive form, this is the one I will also concentrate on here. 
14 There are other problems this paradox raises which I discuss in my book manuscript The Concept of 
Motion in Ancient Greek Thought, chapter 3. 
15 Barnes (1982), p. 263; he obviously follows Thomson’s (1954) summary (without, however, making 
this clear). 
16 Kirk, Raven, and Schofield’s (1983) final comments on the dichotomy paradox sound like a sum-
mary of the supertask debate, p. 272: “[…] philosophers cannot agree whether the impossibility of 
completing the performance of an infinite number of discrete physical acts (if indeed that is impossible) 
is a logical or merely a physical impossibility, nor what in either case the impossibility consists in.” 
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4. A Comparison 
4.1 Analysis of the notion of a task and of a supertask 
The term “supertask” was first introduced into the philosophical conversation17 by 
Thomson in his 1954 paper as referring to an infinity of tasks18 and was taken up in 
the discussion as the notion of an an infinite sequence of actions carried out in a finite 
time. The notion of a task is, in accordance with it, understood as an action or a finite 
sequence of actions carried out in a finite time.19 However, the definition of an “ac-
tion” or “act” involved in such a task or supertask did not receive much attention in 
the debate. Black (1951) understands an act as “something marked off from its sur-
rounding by having a definite beginning and end” and further specifies it in his 1954 
paper20 in the following way:  
Suppose the condition of a body throughout a period of time (t1, t2) is partially represented by 
means of a variable magnitude, m, which is such that (a) m changes during (t1, t2), i.e., does 
not preserve the same value throughout the period, (b), m has “turning points” at both t1 and t2, 
i.e., has either a maximum or a minimum at t2. When these conditions are fulfilled, I propose 
to say the body in question undergoes a well-bounded change. Now a well-bounded change, 
when caused by the body itself, is just what was called an “act” in the preceding essay [i.e. the 
1951 one].  
As an example Black suggests imagining a ball bouncing up and down and replacing 
the ball then by a man jumping up and down – such a man then can be said to perform 
a series of acts.21 We see that for Black, an act has a clear beginning and end, which 
are marked by “turning points”. Allis and Koetsier (1995) take it that an “action, when 
applied in a given world state, results in a change of state.” Laraudogoitia takes up 
this account of an action and elaborates it as follows in his SEP article on supertasks:  
                                                 
17 Cf. for example Laraudogoitia (2001), p.1, and Thomson (1954), p.2. 
18 Thomsen did not, however, think we have the concept of a supertask, since for him the idea of com-
pleting infinitely many tasks (in a finite time) is inconsistent. And Paul Benecerraf understands the 
notion of a supertask as a conceptual mismatch. 
19 Cf. Allis and Koetsier (1995) who understand the difference between a task and a super-task infor-
mally as follows: “a task consists of a finite sequence of actions, while a supertaks consists of an infi-
nite sequence of actions”. 
20 “Is Achilles still running”, in Problems of Analysis, 1954, p.114.  
21 In this 1954 paper, Black also somewhat changes his position – he thinks that if the height of such 
jumping converges to zero, so that we get a convergent series of acts, it is no longer clear that it is im-
possible to perform such an infinite series in a finite time (as this motion does not involve abrogation of 
continuity at the end point; p. 115). Instead Black now retreats to the weaker position that it is still 
illegitimate to talk about an infinite series of acts performed in a finite time “due to the ‘grammar’ of a 
word like “jump”” (p. 116), claiming that a jump cannot get indefinitely small or brief without ceasing 
to be a jump. I will mainly deal with his stronger position in the 1951 paper in the main text. 
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We will assume that at each instant of time the state of the world relevant to a specific action 
can be described by a set S of sentences. Now an action or operation applied to a state of the 
world results in a change in that state, that is, in the set S corresponding to it. Consequently, an 
arbitrary action a will be defined (Allis and Koetsier 1995) as a change in the state of the 
world by which the latter changes from state S before the change to state a(S) after it. This 
means that an action has a beginning and an end, but does not entail that there is a finite lapse 
of time between them.  
For Laraudogoitia, an action has a clear beginning and end, but need not require a laps 
of time between the beginning and the end of a change. He explicitly endorses this 
assumption by claiming that in principle the individual actions need not be temporally 
extended, rather they could also be instantaneous actions. This is an account of action 
that points towards a notion of change in which a change is nothing but a series of 
different states – a notion which is not only fundamental for the supertask debate, but 
also at the core of the at-at-theory of motion.22 Laraudogoitia also adds that an action 
need not involve human agency, and indeed the majority of the supertask literature by 
now has either dealt with machines or particles.  
 Let us look at a paradigmatic supertask to illustrate the central features of an 
act or action. In principle, a task can consist of several actions, but it need not; so let 
us here, for clarity’s sake, deal with the case where a task consists of one action only, 
as is the case with Black’s marble transferring machines Beta and Gamma. Here one 
action is Beta’s transfer of a marble from one side A to the other side B. It starts with 
the beginning of the transfer movement from A and ends with the coming to a stand-
still at B, and is thus clearly distinguished from the next action, which is Gamma’s 
transfer of the marble from B to A. Beta’s and Gamma’s first task each takes a mi-
nute, the second one each half a minute, etc. We see here that an action is a single, 
clearly defined operation that has a definite beginning and end (as claimed by Black 
and Laraudogoitia). It is strictly distinguished from the next action – either by a 
change of the direction of movement, or by a standstill in between two tasks, or by an 
alternating state (what Black (1954) called maximums and minimums).23  
                                                 
22 The at-at-theory of motion assumes a series of states, while supertasks are supposed to be a series of 
actions, but we will see that this does still allow for them displaying an essentially similar structure.   
23 In Black’s construction, the movement from left to right is performed by infinity machine Beta while 
the movement from right to left by the infinity machine Gamma, so different tasks are additionally 
differentiated from each other by different agents. In the case of Black’s infinity machine Alpha, where 
one infinity machine transfers infinitely many different marbles from one side to the other, different 
tasks are additionally differentiated from each other by different marbles moved.  
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A supertask, accordingly, is a series of discrete actions, each of which has a 
beginning and end,24 often an alternating series. No action can be arbitrarily chosen; 
rather each action is clearly determined by the preceding one. By contrast, the begin-
ning of the whole supertask could be changed without changing anything substantial 
about the supertask: we could have Black’s marble transferring machine start one task 
earlier, with Gamma’s transfer of the marble from B to A, and we would still have a 
supertask. Equally, Thomson’s lamp could start two actions earlier (on after 2 
minutes, off after 1 minute) or later (on after ⅛ of a minute, off after ⅟16 off a minute). 
And the end of a supertask is only determined by a set time (after 4 minutes for 
Black’s transferring machine, after 1 minute for Thomson’s lamp), but not by any 
task. It is inherent to a supertask that it cannot have an end defined by a task – after 
all, supertasks are meant to contain infinitely many tasks, so there is no way that we 
can define the last task; we can only give a certain point in time as the end point. 
Let us now see whether Zeno’s paradox does indeed present us with a super-
task and whether a continuous movement as discussed in the dichotomy paradox can 
be understood as such a supertask.  
 
4.2 Motion as presented in Zeno’s paradox 
Zeno’s paradox, as it is handed down to us by Aristotle, claims that “before the thing 
moved gets to the end of its course, it must have arrived at half of it”, and before that 
at half of this half, ad infinitum. So the parts we are dealing with in this paradox are 
gained from a preceding whole (that is halved, and then halved again, etc. – a process 
which essentially depends on there being a whole first that can be halved). The whole 
is given and prior to the parts, since the parts are merely the result of dividing the 
whole. These parts can be freely chosen, and they are always further divisible (the 
half is halved again, etc.), which is one of the main problems the dichotomy paradox 
presents.25  
                                                 
24 It can but need not be temporally extended. 
25 The result of this paradox can be spelt out with the help of Zeno’s plurality paradoxes (Lee fragment 
2 and 3) which show that any way we try to understand the parts resulting from a division of such a 
whole that is divisible without any restriction leads into difficulties. For they are either (α) parts with 
nil extension, which raises the question how even an infinite plurality of unextended parts can ever lead 
to something physically extended; or (β) the parts have some extension, in which case it seem unclear 
in a Zenonian context why an infinite number of these physically extended parts does not lead to an 
infinitely extended whole; or (γ) we do not commit ourselves to either possibility, but claim that we 
could just go on with the division ad infinitum, in which case we are facing the problem that the parts 
are left indeterminate. We can see how all three possibilities may seem problematic, even if all three 
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Accordingly, the dichotomy paradox confronts us with the problem of how to 
think about the possible parts of a continuous motion, which are not simply given but 
can be freely chosen and are always divisible into further parts. Whereas with a super-
task the parts – the individual tasks – are given and clearly defined, with the finite run, 
as presented in the dichotomy paradox, beginning and end are determined, but the 
parts are not. Accordingly, the way movement is presented in the dichotomy paradox 
is not as a series in the way a supertask is, since it does not have any given, discrete 
parts.26 There is nothing like rest, a change of direction, or anything similar that 
would clearly separate one part of the run from the next one. Rather we can mark off 
different parts of the run as we please and always divide them further.  
There have, however, been several attempts in the secondary literature to 
model Zeno’s dichotomy explicitly after a supertask by introducing ways of trans-
forming parts of the run into given parts that are thus clearly separate from each other. 
Most prominently, Adolf Grünbaum introduced a so-called staccato runner who paus-
es after the completion of each part of a run.27 The runner runs half the distance, then 
sits down, and relaxes a bit, before he covers a quarter of the distance, a little pause 
again, an eighth of a distance, etc. In this way the run of the dichotomy paradox seems 
to be a supertask after all. For it seems all Grünbaum does by introducing these pauses 
is to bring out the fact that the run has parts – he is making this just more obvious by 
clearly separating each part from the next with the help of a pause. However, by 
breaking up one movement into such discrete parts, Grünbaum in fact changes the 
situation in question fundamentally. Instead of dealing with one uninterrupted and 
thus continuous motion and its possible parts, as in Zeno’s paradox, we are now deal-
ing with an infinity of different runs. Grünbaum does not give any reason why this 
myriad of single runs, interrupted by pauses, should still be considered as one run, 
rather than as a series of different and independent runs. It seems that each individual 
                                                                                                                                            
have at times been embraced by the tradition following Zeno. This trilemma is not meant as an analysis 
of the runner paradox itself, but rather shows the problematic consequences for the notion of parts it 
seems to leave us with. 
26 Barnes (1982) p. 264 admits that the notion of a task does not appear in our account of Zeno’s para-
dox: “for it is mildly odd to call each of b’s successive moves to the next ai a ‘run’ or a ‘task’. Yet the 
point is merely verbal: Zeno himself does not use the terminology”. But as Barnes believes that the 
runner has infinitely many subsections of AB to traverse, he thinks the “claim that b’s operations are 
not ‘tasks’, or are only ‘tasks’ in a Pickwickian sense” to be “boring”. The problem is, however, not 
boredom, but that we are changing the conception of the very structure of continuous motion as pre-
sented to us in the paradox if we understand it as a sequence of runs. 
27 Grünbaum (1968), p.79. The staccato runner is taken up again by Salmon (1980), p. 47; Barnes 
(1982), p. 267; and Moore (1990), pp.3-4. 
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little run can be considered as a continuous motion, but that the series of runs he thus 
constructed very clearly cannot be constructed to be continuous.  
And we are getting very different kinds of parts: in Grünbaum’s scenario we 
are dealing with parts whose identity is clearly fixed by two surrounding stretches of 
rest, while in Zeno’s case we are dealing with parts whose identity rests only on our 
mind marking them off and which can easily be changed (for example, we would get 
into the very same paradox if we claimed to mark off a third of the given whole, and a 
third of the third, etc.). Thus, Grünbaum and Zeno are actually talking about two dif-
ferent problems – Zeno talks about a continuous run, Grünbaum about a series of dis-
crete states.28 
 We may be tempted to think that whatever is the case with the dichotomy, 
Zeno’s paradox of Achilles and the tortoise, nevertheless, seems to be a supertask: 
this latter paradox attempts to show that when Achilles starts behind the slowest one 
in a race, a tortoise as later authors have it, it seems impossible that he will ever over-
take the tortoise. For first, Achilles has to cover the distance from his starting point, 
A, to the starting point of the tortoise, B. In the meantime the tortoise has moved on to 
another point B1, and when Achilles reaches this next point B1 the tortoise will have 
moved ahead again to B2. But while the distances between the successive Bs will in-
creasingly diminish, it seems that no matter which Bn Achilles has reached, the tor-
toise will always have moved to Bn+1. It seems that here there is no given whole from 
which the parts are derived; and Achilles has to perform an infinite series of tasks in 
order to level with the tortoise.  
However, as Aristotle has already pointed out in his Physics, 239b18ff., from a 
logical point of view, this paradox is simply a variation of the dichotomy paradox.29 
The whole that gets divided in this paradox is the distance between Achilles’ starting 
point A and the possible point C where Achilles and the tortoise are at the same level 
(even if this last point does not belong to the points reached by the construction 
                                                 
28 Black, Max, “Achilles and the Tortoise”, in: Analysis 11 (1951) and Thomson (1954) draw the con-
clusion that the assumption of completing infinitely many tasks leads to absurdities, and thus is logical-
ly not possible. Accordingly, they reason that the run in Zeno’s paradox cannot be correctly described 
as completing an infinite sequence of tasks as it is obviously physically possible and so needs another 
conceptualisation. Salmon (1980), on the other hand, thinks that some small modifications, as, e.g., 
letting the distance which the button of Thomson’s lamp is moved during each switch converge to zero, 
are enough to make the infinity machine logically possible and of the same logical structure as the run 
of a finite distance, see pp. 46-48.   
29 Many modern scholars follow this assessment; cf. Barnes (1982), p. 274, Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 
(1983), p. 272, and Ferber (1995), pp. 8-10. 
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sketched in the paradox). While in the runner paradox the distance was divided by 
halving it, here the track is divided by the tortoise’s motion, which Achilles then “in-
herits”. Again, we do not have discrete tasks that the tortoise performs and that are 
distinguished from each other by periods of rest, change of direction, or something of 
this kind. Rather, we have a continuous motion of the tortoise, and at certain times 
(when Achilles has reached the point the tortoise left) we look how far it has already 
proceeded. 
We should also note that the basic paradox is independent of whether the divi-
sion is regular or not, for the tortoise could move in an irregular way (slower at some 
times, a bit faster at others within a certain range) and we would still get the same 
paradox. By contrast, supertasks depend on a regular division, since only such a divi-
sion can be said to converge to a certain limit, while Zeno’s paradox would also 
works with irregular divisions.  
4. 3 The unity of a continuous motion 
Zeno’s dichotomy paradox invites us to think about what exactly the relation is be-
tween the whole of a run and the parts that we can gain from it. But it does not treat a 
continuous run as a supertask, which is a clear advantage if we want to understand 
continuous processes. For in order to conceptualize continuous processes, and that 
means processes that are necessarily temporally extended, thinking of them in terms 
of supertasks leads us down a mistaken path. 
Now Zeno presents us with a paradox, the paradox that in order to cover a fi-
nite distance in a finite time it seems we need to cover infinitely many spatial parts. 
Given that it is a paradox, we’d better be cautious not to take his account of motion at 
face value, for we know that in so far as it is a paradox something has to be wrong 
with this conceptualization of motion – there is another mistaken path here. And when 
we try to conceptualize continuous motion, we do not have to use division into two as 
the principle of division, as is the case in the set up of the dichotomy. In principle, 
parts can be freely chosen as we please. However, the way motion is presented in the 
dichotomy paradox gives us an understanding of the part-whole structure of a contin-
uous motion that is an important alternative to the one we encounter with supertasks, 
and one that is worth exploring further.  
Thinking of continuous processes as supertasks seems to be supported by hav-
ing come to think of processes as nothing but a series of states of being at a particular 
   12 
 
 
place (or in a particular condition) at a particular time – along the lines of the so-
called at-at-theory of motion prevalent since Russell in metaphysical debates (who 
prominently used it in his discussion of Zeno’s arrow paradox).30 Such an understand-
ing of processes prepares the ground for introducing the notion of a supertask as it 
conceptualizes processes as a series consisting of given discrete elements. If we com-
bine this understanding with the mathematical notion of a convergent geometrical 
series, i.e. with the mathematical idea that the sum of infinitely many summands that 
get smaller and smaller is finite, we arrive at the idea that continuous processes may 
be captured as supertasks (if supertasks are indeed possible).  
However, looking at the differences I have pointed out between Zeno’s di-
chotomy paradox and supertasks, we may start to doubt whether processes like a con-
tinuous run can indeed be genuinely conceptualized as supertasks. For continuous 
processes do not seem to share their main structure with supertasks. A supertask is a 
series in which each part is defined while the beginning and the end of the whole are 
undetermined. The clear division between two parts (tasks) is a necessary characteris-
tic of the series “supertask” – the division is due to the change of direction, or the 
change from a maximum to a minimum, etc., so there is no other division possible. 
But such a division is not a characteristic of the “series” “run”. However, if not even a 
single action making up a task is clearly marked within a continuous motion, it seems 
hard to define the whole movement as a supertask. Continuous motion seems to have 
essentially a different mereological structure, a different part-whole relation, than a 
supertask has, and thus to raise different questions about its unity: supertasks seem to 
work with a weak notion of a whole, for, as we saw earlier, nothing changes for the 
supertask if we start a few tasks earlier or later. By contrast, continuous motions seem 
to involve a weak notion of a part, since they can be freely chosen.31 Not all parts we 
can choose are disjoint. For example, if I chose as parts the first three quarters of the 
whole as well as the last two thirds, these parts will overlap, and thus not be disjoint. 
We can, however, chose disjoint parts, as, for example, the first quarter and the last 
third of the whole. But even if we chose distinct and disjoint parts of a run, the identi-
ty of these parts is not given, as it is in the supertask case, and the whole run does not 
settle their identity. Accordingly, while we can choose distinct parts, they will not be 
                                                 
30 Cf. also Salmon (1975), Space, Time, and Motion, pp. 40-42. 
31 This understanding of continuous motion fits with Aristotle’s, which I discuss in detail in my book 
manuscript The Concept of Motion in Ancient Greek Thought, chapter 7. 
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separate parts in the sense that a clear mechanism (like a change of direction or a 
standstill) marks them off from each other and fixes their identity. If somebody were 
to ask “but isn’t the runner running each of the parts of the whole”, we would have to 
answer: what do you understand by “each of its parts”? The overlapping as well as the 
non-overlapping ones? Each possible part somebody might choose? Such a question, 
it seems, presupposes that the parts are somehow already given, and thus can or can-
not be covered. 
Hence, I agree with Black and Thomson that continuous motion as described 
in the dichotomy paradox cannot be understood as a supertask, though for a different 
reason: not, as Black and Thomson suppose, because supertasks are logically impos-
sible (since the last state of the series cannot be determined) – in the present paper I 
remain neutral on this question. But rather because the actions of a supertask have to 
be understood quite differently to the parts of a run: with a finite run beginning and 
end are clearly defined, while parts can be chosen as we please, whereas with a super-
task beginning and end can vary, while each task (each part) is clearly defined.  
But if we cannot think of continuous processes as supertasks, we should also 
reconsider what has supported this assumption in the first place, namely the so-called 
at-at-theory of motion. This theory is often helpful to describe a motion or change – 
something changes from being F at t1 to not-being F at t2 – especially if we want to 
perform mathematical calculations. But this way of describing motion leaves out an 
important feature, the very feature of physical continuity. And if we want to concep-
tualize continuous motion in a way that also captures the difference to a series of dis-
crete snapshots, we’d better not understand motion as consisting32 in being at a par-
ticular point at a particular time.33  
Note that if I point out the difference in the merelogical structure between the 
description offered by the at-at-theory and continuous motion, I am not thus claiming 
that all motion has to be continuous – there may very well be series of discrete jumps, 
                                                 
32 Black (1954), p. 125, n.18 also points out that even if a mathematical description is correct, this does 
not yet demonstrate that “each distinguishable item of the mathematical description must be in a one-
to-one correspondence with distinguishable items of physical reality”. 
33 As, for example, Salmon does, who in his account of Zeno’s arrow paradox claims that “[...] motion 
itself is described by the pairing of positions with times alone. [...] the motion consists in being at a 
particular point at a particular time” (p. 41, his italics). We see that he switches, without any explana-
tion or justification, from talking about how “motion itself is described” to “motion consists in being at 
a particular point at a particular time”. From the fact that in mathematics motion can be described as 
the “pairing of positions with times” he infers “motion to be composed of immobilities,” ascribing the 
mathematical concept to motion itself.   
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for example at the subatomic level; but this is not the motion I am concerned with 
here. 
5. Conclusion 
Summing up, we can say that the dichotomy paradox and supertasks raise genuinely 
different questions about processes. Looking at these differences, we may think that 
this is not just a historic accident, but that there are indeed essential differences be-
tween a finite continuous run and supertasks in the kind of unity they require. In the 
case of a supertask, we start out with given discrete states, the individual actions, 
which constitute the whole of a supertask. The unity of such a supertask is based on 
the rule that the same task has to be performed in a constantly diminishing time, while 
beginning and end are determined externally by the time fixed. By contrast, the unity 
of a continuous motion over a certain finite distance is not defined by any rule deter-
mining a series of fixedly given tasks, but rather by the phases of rest which mark the 
beginning and end of the movement. In this case, neither are there any parts given nor 
are these parts fixed once some parts have been freely chosen, since there is no better 
reason to determine a chosen piece as a part than to take, for instance, the halves of 
this piece as parts.  
So while with a continuous finite run, beginning and end are determined but 
the parts can be chosen as one pleases, arbitrarily, with a supertask it is the other way 
around: each single task, and thus each part, is determined, while the beginning and 
the end of the whole supertask can be chosen. And with supertasks there can be paus-
es between each task, since the absence of rest is not important for the unity of a su-
pertask, whereas it is essential for the unity of a continuous motion.  
Zeno’s paradox forces us to think about what kind of whole a continuous run 
is. And comparing supertasks with Zeno’s paradoxes helps to see that continuous mo-
tion presents us with a genuinely different part-whole relation than supertasks do – 
this is the philosophically central point of the comparison, since a correct understand-
ing of the mereological structure of motion is crucial for its adequate conception. The 
at-at-theory of motion is one reason why this difference tends to be overlooked.  
Accordingly, while Zeno might have inspired the supertask debate and can be 
seen as its precursor in this sense, he did not start the debate. For the central question 
he puts forward – how can we think about a continuous motion where parts can be 
derived from the whole that are always further divisible and any attempt to conceptu-
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alize such parts seems to be problematic – is different from the one the supertask de-
bate raises. 
So whether or not we think supertasks are possible, whether or not we think 
that supertasks are confused concepts, if we understand a run as an infinite series of 
tasks we are not understanding it as a continuous motion any longer. Now there might 
be contexts where we want to use the notion of a supertask for describing34 a motion 
nevertheless; but we should be aware that characterising something continuous like a 
run as a supertask means missing out on the specific unity required for conceptualis-
ing continuous motion. And we should thus also reconsider our usage of the at-at-
theory of motion – while it is helpful for calculations, it may not be an adequate con-
ceptualization of motion. 
Whereas Thomson and Black were reluctant to understand the dichotomy as a 
supertask, the later supertask debate got rid of any doubts and took this paradox as the 
founding father of all supertasks. The reason, I think, the dichotomy is understood as 
a supertask, lies in a lack of analysis of what is actually understood by the actions that 
are seen as making up a supertask. The mathematical notion of a convergent geomet-
rical series, where the sum of infinitely many summands is finite, seems to have been 
applied to a variety of physical phenomena without first clarifying whether this math-
ematical notion can indeed be applied in all these cases. So the first question with 
respect to a continuous run should not be how such a supertaks is logically and physi-
cally possible, but rather whether the notion of a supertask can indeed be applied to 
continuous motion, and what is specific for continuous motion that has to be taken 
into account so as not to apply something inappropriately.35 
                                                 
34 Cf. also Black for this difference and my book manuscript The Concept of Motion in Ancient Greek 
Thought, chapter 3. 
35 I want to thank Peter Clark for first introducing me to the supertaks debate. The initial version of the 
paper also profited a lot from discussions with Uli Bergman. 
